Policy
Most deliberate slowing of technology happens through rules rather than through physics. This is what those rules do, to which constraint, and who publicly asked for them.
- Rules tracked
- How this is computedCount of policy instruments in the corpus; each one links its official text.Method →Code →
- across How this is computedNumber of distinct country codes on the rows being counted (makers, or rules).Method →Code → jurisdictions
- Slow building
- How this is computedRules counted by the effect recorded on each: "tightens" slows building, "loosens" speeds it; a rule recorded as both ways is counted in neither.Method →Code →
- controls, tariffs, safeguards
How this is kept honest. Every rule here was fetched and read on the date shown, and carries one sentence from its own source. An organisation is named as having asked for a rule only where it says so in its own release, filing or testimony — never inferred from who benefits. Where nobody has been identified, the row says that rather than implying nobody asked.
01Rules that slow building
2026 update of the EU control list of dual-use items
Adds chipmaking equipment to the EU control list, including deposition tools for molybdenum and ruthenium and EUV mask inspection.
Adopted 14 September 2026 and NOT yet in force: it enters into force on publication in the Official Journal after a two-month scrutiny period for the Council and Parliament. It transposes 2025 decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group and Nuclear Suppliers Group rather than being a unilateral EU move.
Bears onRuthenium, sputtering and ALD gradeEUV projection optics
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“Semiconductor manufacturing and testing equipment and materials (e.g. Atomic Layer Deposition equipment for molybdenum and Ruthenium, equipment for the development and the inspection of Extreme Ultra-Violet masks and reticles, and single wafer cleaning equipment)”
European Commission, DG Trade and Economic Security ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
Safeguard investigation into imports of grain-oriented electrical steel
Opens the question of whether to restrict imports of the steel that goes inside large power transformers.
An investigation, not a measure. Provisional measures are possible roughly four to five months in. GOES already carries anti-dumping duties against several origins.
Bears onGrain-oriented electrical steel (GOES)
Asked for by · thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel (what they filed ↗) — Called publicly for prompt EU trade protection on grain-oriented electrical steel, one day before the investigation opened.Source
“Today, the European Commission initiated an investigation to assess whether safeguard measures are needed for EU manufacturers of grain-oriented electrical sheets (GOES).”
European Commission, DG Trade and Economic Security ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
Announcement No. 18 of 2025 on export control of certain medium and heavy rare-earth items
Puts seven rare earths under licence, including dysprosium and terbium — the elements that keep a magnet strong when it gets hot.
Effective on issuance.
Bears onDysprosium metalDidymium (Nd-Pr) metal, magnet feedRare-earth magnet sintering
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation, with the approval of the State Council, a decision is made to implement export control on the following items”
Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
Foreign-produced direct product rule additions, including controls on high-bandwidth memory
Brought the memory stacks that feed AI accelerators inside the export-control perimeter.
Interim final rule, published 5 December 2024, effective 2 December 2024.
Bears onHigh-bandwidth memory stacking yieldAdvanced packaging capacity
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“adding new controls for certain high bandwidth memory important for advanced computing, and clarifying controls on certain software keys that allow for the use of items such as software tools”
Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
Announcement No. 46 of 2024 on strengthening export controls of dual-use items to the United States
Bans dual-use exports to US military users, and says licences for gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the US will in principle not be granted.
In force from 3 December 2024. Secondary reports say these measures were suspended in November 2025 under a US–China agreement; no primary source confirming the suspension was reachable, so the status here is what the original announcement says.
Bears onGallium, refined
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“禁止两用物项对美国军事用户或军事用途出口。原则上不予许可镓、锗、锑、超硬材料相关两用物项对美国出口。 (Export of dual-use items to US military users or for military end-use is prohibited. Licences for gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard dual-use items to the United States will in principle not be granted.)”
Ministry of Commerce ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689)
The first broad AI statute. Above a training-compute threshold, a model is presumed to carry systemic risk and additional obligations attach.
In force since 1 August 2024; the obligations on general-purpose models applied from 2 August 2025. The 10^25 FLOP threshold that presumes systemic risk is Article 51(2); the official register was unreachable behind a bot challenge, so that figure is sourced secondarily and marked below.
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“On 1 August 2024, the European Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) enters into force.”
European Parliament and Council ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
October 2023 update to the advanced computing and semiconductor equipment controls
Closed the routes around the 2022 rule and widened what counts as a controlled chip.
Two interim final rules issued together, published 25 October 2023, effective 17 November 2023.
Bears onLeading-edge foundry capacity
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“These revisions protect U.S. national security interests by further restricting China's ability to obtain critical technologies to modernize its military capabilities in ways that threaten the national security interests of the United States and its allies.”
Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
Announcement No. 23 of 2023 on export controls for gallium- and germanium-related items
Eight gallium and six germanium item classes may not leave China without an export licence.
Issued 3 July 2023, in force from 1 August 2023. A licence requirement, not a ban.
Bears onGallium, refined
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“为维护国家安全和利益，经国务院批准，决定对镓、锗相关物项实施出口管制。 (To safeguard national security and interests, with State Council approval, it is decided to implement export controls on gallium- and germanium-related items.)”
Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
Additional export controls on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items
The rule that made advanced chips and the machines that make them a controlled export.
Interim final rule, published 13 October 2022, effective 7 October 2022 — which is why it is usually called the October 7 rule.
Bears onLeading-edge foundry capacityEUV lithography scanners
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“BIS is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement necessary controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and certain semiconductor manufacturing items.”
Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
02Rules that speed building, or cut both ways
Proclamation 11052: adjusting imports of polysilicon and its derivatives
Treats imported polysilicon as a national-security matter. It protects US production and raises the cost of importing the material every wafer starts from.
A two-step instrument: Commerce opened the investigation on 1 July 2025; the proclamation was signed 6 August 2026 and published 11 August 2026.
Bears onElectronic-grade polysilicon
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“the Secretary found and advised me of his opinion that polysilicon and its derivative products are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States.”
Executive Office of the President, on a Section 232 report from the Department of Commerce ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
ADVANCE Act of 2024 (Division B of Public Law 118-67)
Tells the US nuclear regulator to license new reactors faster and more cheaply, which is the slow step for new firm power.
Enacted 9 July 2024. It directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission — lower licensing fees, hiring, review deadlines — rather than being a regulator’s own rule. Division A of the same law is unrelated.
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“This division may be cited as the ``Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024'' or the ``ADVANCE Act of 2024''.”
118th Congress ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
Order No. 2023: improvements to generator interconnection procedures and agreements
Rewrites how new generation joins the US grid: first-ready first-served clusters, deadlines and penalties, aimed squarely at the queue.
Issued 28 July 2023, published 6 September 2023, effective 6 November 2023. A rehearing order followed in 2024.
Bears onGrid interconnection queues
Asked for by · None identifiedSource
“The Commission is adopting reforms to its pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Procedures... to address interconnection queue backlogs, improve certainty, and prevent undue discrimination for new technologies.”
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ↗Official source · read 2026-09-15
03By jurisdiction
| Jurisdiction | Slowing | Speeding or mixed | |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Sets the export rules most of the chip chain is written against. | 3 | 3 |
| European Union | Trade defence, dual-use controls, and the first broad AI statute. | 3 | — |
| China | Holds the refining and magnet steps, and licenses their export. | 3 | — |
| Japan | Chemistry and precision machinery the rest of the chain qualifies against. | — | — |
| South Korea | Memory and wafer capacity. | — | — |
| Taiwan | Leading-edge foundry and advanced packaging. | — | — |
| Netherlands | The lithography chokepoint sits here. | — | — |
| United Kingdom | Research base and grid connection reform. | — | — |
| Germany | Optics, electrical steel and industrial gases. | — | — |
| Switzerland | Where this project is written. | — | — |
A jurisdiction with no number is one nothing has been researched for yet, not one with no rules.
04What we would change
United States · decided by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state regulators
Standardise large power transformer specifications across utilities so orders are interchangeable rather than bespoke.
A large share of the lead time is that almost every transformer is custom, which stops manufacturers from building to stock and makes a cancelled order worthless to the next buyer.
- Expected effect
- Shorter effective lead times without new factories, because a standard unit can be built before it is sold.
- What would show this is wrong
- Lead times staying above three years in markets that have standardised, which would mean the constraint is core steel and winding capacity rather than specification churn.
European Union · decided by European Commission and national transmission regulators
Adopt the first-ready first-served cluster study approach with binding study deadlines, as the United States did in 2023.
Speculative applications clog a queue that is processed one project at a time, and a datacentre with a signed site still waits years for a connection date.
- Expected effect
- Queue times falling toward the study deadline rather than the backlog length.
- What would show this is wrong
- US queue times not falling in the years after Order No. 2023, which would suggest the reform addresses the wrong step.
European Union · decided by European Commission, with standards bodies
Fund and recognise shared qualification testbeds for second-source materials, so a grade qualified once is accepted across more buyers.
Qualification is per process, per factory, per application, which is why a substitute that exists in a laboratory does not relieve a shortage for years.
- Expected effect
- Second sources reaching production in quarters rather than years, which is the single largest lever on materials-stage relief time.
- What would show this is wrong
- Shared testbeds existing and qualification cycles staying at multi-year length anyway, which would mean the delay is buyer risk appetite rather than test capacity.